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ABSTRACT
Research on policy responsiveness of the European Union has adopted the
systemic model from national contexts. This focusses on the static
congruence or the dynamic adaptation of aggregated policy output and
similarly aggregated public opinion. Approaches in this vein provide relevant
insights and uncover a surprising degree of EU responsiveness. Yet, this
debate contribution argues that they only insufficiently capture indirect
accountability chains and the emerging challenges of public EU politicization
and mediatization. We establish the need for procedural perspectives that
addresses how the different EU institutions perceive and digest public opinion
and subsequently influence it through communication. To further this
research agenda, we sketch the contours of a procedural model by
highlighting possible variation at the input, throughput and output stages.
Going full circle, we suggest, allows us to better understand the responses to
public opinion and their wider implications for the societal acceptance of the
unfinished supranational polity.
KEYWORDS European Union; institutions; mediatization; politicization; process; responsiveness
Introduction
In contemporary European Union politics, understanding whether and how
supranational policy aligns with the preferences of the wider citizenry
seems to be more important than ever. The recent rise of populist challenger
parties throughout Europe combines fundamental opposition to suprana-
tional authority with calls for more direct democracy. The electoral success
of this particular mobilization strategy suggests that many EU citizens
believe that EU policies do not respond to their preferences. But where and
how does responsiveness to citizen preferences actually figure in the
complex EU policy-making machinery?
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Weargue that this question cannot be tackled sufficiently by simply transfer-
ring what the introduction to this collection has called the systemic model of
responsiveness to EU policy-making. This model concentrates on electoral
accountability as the key mechanism establishing responsiveness and empiri-
cally assesses it along the static congruence or the dynamic adaptation of
aggregated public opinion polls and similarly aggregated policy output.
Based on the assumption that vote choices are driven by largely correct retro-
spective assessments of policy output, political actors caring about re-election
have incentives topander topublic opinion in an anticipatorymannerwhen for-
mulating policy. In this view, public opinion has famously been conceptualized
as a ‘thermostat’ that consistently corrects direction and output of government
policy (Hakhverdian 2012; Wlezien 1995). Correlational analyses following this
standard model demonstrate a rather high level of aggregated responsiveness
in national democracies and highlight moderating effects of public issue sal-
ience (Burstein 2010), the ideological leeway of governing actors (Jensen and
Mortensen 2014), or the clarity of electoral accountability chains in different
institutional variants of representative democracy (Wlezien and Soroka 2012).
This model provides highly valuable insights on the functioning of substan-
tive democracy at the national level. We also have to note that its applications
to the EU have uncovered surprisingly strong empirical links between the
support for political integration in aggregated public opinion and the aggre-
gated amount of supranational policy output (Bølstad 2015; Franklin and
Wlezien 1997; Toshkov 2011).
Yet, like the other contributions in this debate section, we have doubts that
mere comparisons of aggregated input and output indicators sufficiently illu-
minate the causal mechanisms linking the preferences of the wider citizenry
to substantive policy choices in the EU. Like Meijers et al. (2019) we are not
convinced that this highly aggregated perspective fits the multiplicity of
actors and ‘their’ audiences involved in EU policy-making. And similar to Steu-
nenberg (2019), we also do not consider the adoption of EU legislation as the
final point in time at which responsiveness should be assessed.
However, these contributions remain fundamentally wedded to the
concept of responsiveness as a product. This product, they argue from
different perspectives, should then be related to independent variables to
establish causality. Our contribution, in contrast, suggests moving beyond
comparative statics by focusing on the process of responding rather than the
product of responsiveness as the main phenomenon to be explained. We
come to advocate this approach by highlighting three more specific
context conditions of contemporary EU policy-making that challenge the sys-
temic model of responsiveness research in section two: (1) an active policy-
making role of non-majoritarian institutions; (2) the differentiated politiciza-
tion of European integration; and (3) the mediatization of politics more gener-
ally. These challenges, we argue, warrant a procedural perspective on EU
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responsiveness. We sketch the contours of such an alternative model in
section three. Scrutinizing and comparing how different EU institutions per-
ceive, digest, and influence public opinion promises deeper insights on how
responsive supranational policy-making actually is and which adjusting mech-
anisms it offers for accommodating the current public scepticism.
Three challenges of the standard model in contemporary EU
policy-making
To start with, the almost exclusive focus on electoral accountability as the key
responsiveness mechanism seems ill-suited to capture the influence of non-
majoritarian institutions in contemporary EU policy-making. Of course, virtually
all institutionalized forms of representative democracy deliberately attempt to
isolate some portion of governance functions from public opinion. Imple-
menting agencies, central banks, and constitutional courts are usually not sup-
posed to be responsive to the vagaries of public opinion (even though they
are sometimes, e.g., Hall 2014; McGuire and Stimson 2004). They are rather
expected to act on stable, impartial rules and high levels of sectoral expertise.
In contrast to most national political systems, however, such non-majoritarian
institutions have much more pronounced policy-making roles in the EU polity.
This holds with regard to tertiary law-making by agencies and regulatory net-
works (Rittberger and Wonka 2011). Yet, it also holds with regard to secondary
law-making that has been the prime focus of most EU responsiveness
research thus far. Non-majoritarian institutions – most notably the European
Commission and the European Court of Justice – perform key tasks in the
policy cycle such as the initiation, drafting, and review of binding EU law.
For our argument, two things are especially noteworthy. First, the empow-
erment of these non-majoritarian actors has been an intentional choice of
institutional design: delegating policy powers to originally insulated organiz-
ations was meant to overcome credible commitment problems of national
governments facing varying short-term political pressures at home (e.g.,
Majone 2000; Moravcsik 1998). Second, even though these institutions have
often acted as policy entrepreneurs and also gained high public visibility,
they are not linked to the European electorates through direct, institutiona-
lized accountability chains thus far.1
Against this relevance of non-majoritarian institutions, explaining respon-
siveness only along electoral accountability risks to miss important elements
of EU policy-making. This does not dismiss research on the responsiveness of
EU institutions with more direct accountability chains such as the Council
(Schneider 2019; Wratil 2018a) or the European Parliament (Williams and
Spoon 2015). Nor does it suggest that the European Commission, the Euro-
pean Court of Justice, or other non-majoritarian agencies are not responsive
at all (to the contrary, see below). But it does suggest that a more complete
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understanding of EU responsiveness needs to explicitly cover the particular
incentives of non-majoritarian institutions as well. For these institutions, poss-
ible clashes with their original mandates, organizational setups and policy
legacies, as well as the risk to alienate their traditional principals when
giving in to short-term political pressures emerging from public opinion has
to be factored in as well.
A second challenge that hampers the straightforward application of the
systemic model to EU policy-making emerges from the politicization of Euro-
pean integration (De Wilde 2011). At first sight, and in line with the standard
model’s emphasis on public salience as a moderating variable, the increasing
risk that European decisions become subject of highly visible and controver-
sial public debates should create incentives for more responsiveness at the
European level. Indeed, initial research shows that both majoritarian (Schnei-
der 2019; Wratil 2018a) but also non-majoritarian institutions adapt policy
choices in the light of intensifying public debates about European integration
(Blauberger et al. 2018; Rauh 2018; Van der Veer and Haverland 2018). But at
the same time, the public politicization of European integration also increases
the complexity of political conflict against which possibly responsive Euro-
pean policy has to be formulated.
Three things are particularly noteworthy for our argument. First, EU politi-
cization and the salience of specific policy issues vary not only over time but
also across issue areas and, most notably, across member states (De Wilde
et al. 2016; Rauh 2016: Ch. 2; Wratil 2019). Second, various empirical
approaches to EU politicization stress that it is part and parcel of emerging
cultural conflict lines that increasingly structure political competition but
cut across the traditional socio-economic lines of conflict (De Vries 2018;
Hooghe and Marks 2009; Hutter et al. 2016; Zürn and de Wilde 2016). And
third, EU politicization often involves ‘polity contestation’, meaning debates
that challenge the EU’s ‘right to rule’ in principle (De Wilde and Lord 2016;
De Wilde and Trenz 2012).
The systemic model’s focus on one-dimensional policy choices (often: more
or less spending) falls short of capturing such political complexities. This has
already been noted in research focussing on responsiveness in national con-
texts (most recently: Rasmussen et al. 2019). But we argue that this shortcom-
ing is particularly pronounced in EU policy-making. Even if supranational
policy-makers have incentives to respond to public opinion, they will have
to make choices as to which parts of the European public they want to
focus on. And even if they can identify a policy that satisfies the relevant
parts of the European public, they will also have to evaluate whether this
very public also prefers to have this choice taken at the supranational level
at all. Rather than assuming a consistent public opinion that functions as a
simple thermostat, a convincing account of responsiveness in EU policy-
making should thus be able to factor in the various trade-offs that policy-
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makers face against the background of differentiated politicization of Euro-
pean integration.
A third and final challenge to the input-output comparisons the systemic
model relies upon is the accelerating mediatization of contemporary politics.
That a crucial part of the interaction between policy-makers and the affected
societies occurs through indirect encounters in mediated public spheres is in
itself nothing new (Gamson and Wolfsfeld 1993; Koopmans 2004). Indeed,
media coverage of policy output has been identified as an important link in
the ‘thermostat’ model of responsiveness (Soroka and Wlezien 2019; Williams
and Schoonvelde 2018). But we also know from news value theory that such
mass-mediated discourses introduce distortions, biases, and adverse incen-
tives. It amplifies conflict, personalization, and negativity in political communi-
cation (Galtung and Ruge 1965; Manin 1997: 218–34).
For our argument, two things are especially noteworthy here. First, this
mediatization is accelarating. While traditional television, for example, was
prone to unite the citizenry into a single public that was exposed to similar
news around the same time (Wigbold 1979), contemporary digital media
outlets and the proliferation of political information through social media
channels shorten the news cycle and create niche publics with selective infor-
mation exposure (Garrett 2009). Second, focussing on immediate communi-
cation and short-term newsworthiness challenges the traditional modes of
policy-making in the EU which emphasize compromise solutions, long-term
planning, and strong reliance on expertise.
This accelerating mediatization renders it questionable that low-frequency
polls are good indicators for the information that policy-makers have when
making their choices.2 Rather, mediatization should make it more difficult
to figure out what ‘the public’ as a single body actually wants. The salience
of specific policy issues becomes much more volatile so that mediatization
speeds up the feedback loops between policy output and public opinion for-
mation. Thus mediatization creates new, often rather pragmatic challenges for
policy-makers aspiring to be responsive. In conjunction with public EU politi-
cization, furthermore, mediatization requires active communication and jus-
tification efforts on part of the policy-makers themselves. This challenges
the traditionally more technocratic ways of decision-making in the EU.
However, mediatization might also present an opportunity by enabling
more direct communication with citizens. The institutions that are remote
from electoral politics can more easily defend their policy choices themselves
and in real time (Gilad et al. 2015), thus circumventing otherwise long and
indirect accountability chains. We see, for example, that governance insti-
tutions beyond the nation state professionalize their public communication
efforts when being faced with public politicization (Ecker-Ehrhardt 2018).
Mediatization thus creates pragmatic hurdles in identifying public opinion,
but it also incentivizes and facilitates what the Zhelyazkova, Bølstad, and
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Meijers (2019) as well as Meijers et al. (2019) discuss as ‘rhetorical’ or ‘signal-
ling’ responsiveness.
To sum up, we identify three context conditions of contemporary EU
policy-making that challenge key assumptions and approaches in the sys-
temic model of responsiveness. First, the relevance of non-majoritarian insti-
tutions problematizes electoral accountability as the key theoretical
mechanism. Second, the politicization of European integration problematizes
the assumption of one-dimensional policy-making and the identification of
stable majorities in the European citizenry. And third, the accelerating media-
tization problematizes the identification of a single public opinion and high-
lights the role of autonomous communicative responsiveness by individual
EU institutions.
A procedural perspective on responsiveness in EU policy-
making
Against these three challenges, we propose to complement comparisons of
aggregated public opinion and aggregated policy output with research that
takes a decidedly procedural perspective on how public opinion and
specific policy choices interact. More systematic knowledge on how
different EU institutions perceive, digest, and inform public opinion is needed.
Such a procedural perspective promises to identify the break-points and
the possible adjusting mechanisms of responsive or non-responsive policy-
making in the EU. More complete causal accounts of how public opinion is
digested by andwithin individual organizations would also tackle the question
of whether responsiveness is ‘actively’ created or just reflects a spurious cor-
relation driven by cueing efforts of policy-making elites (cf. Zhelyazkova,
Bølstad, and Meijers 2019). With the above sketched challenges of non-major-
itarian institutions, public EU politicization, and mediatization in mind, Figure
1 sketches the contours of such a procedural model of EU responsiveness.
This model is inspired by theories of organizational mediatization and
reputation management developed primarily in the context of national
Figure 1. Contours of a procedural model of EU responsiveness.
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bureaucracies (e.g., Maor and Sulitzeanu-Kenan 2016; Schillemans 2012;
Schulz 2004; Thorbjornsrud et al. 2014). Rather than assuming that policy-
makers and citizens have perfect information about public opinion, policy
output, and policy effects, respectively, we propose to analyse responsiveness
through the lens of behaviour within the policy-making organization of
interest.
Regarding responsiveness at the input stage of EU institutions (cf. Meijers
et al. 2019), we propose to not only ask whether policy makers take positions
in response to public opinion but how they do so. To which extent and for
which reasons does the organization in question dedicate resources and
staff to monitor polls, media coverage, and online debates considered rel-
evant to its specific policy competences? What sources do officials employ,
which elements of ‘public opinion’ do they consider important, and how sys-
tematic is the production and distribution of this knowledge within the organ-
ization? These questions call for systematic, comparative case studies of
organizational resources and behaviours across individual EU policy-making
institutions and time. Organizational charts and strategic development
plans as well as questionnaires and interviews among EU institutional staff
could shed light on this. Such research would illuminate what supranational
policy makers actually believe to know about public preferences and would
shed light on the incentives of non-majoritarian institutions, in particular.
Regarding throughput, we propose to investigate the extent to which this
knowledge and dedicated communication staff are leveraged during policy-
making. At which stage do public relation considerations enter the policy-for-
mulation process? How much importance is ascribed to public relations rela-
tive to other organizational goals and mandates? How influential are public
relations officials within the organization? These questions call for research
that focusses on individual policy choices as the unit of analysis and
process tracing analyses. Comparing the anticipation of public reactions
across policy-drafting processes in the Commission (e.g., Hartlapp et al.
2014: Chapter 9) or Council negotiations (Wratil and Hobolt 2019), for
example, should illuminate how policy-makers deal with the complexity of
EU politicization and value it relative to more functional concerns that have
traditionally dominated EU policy-making.
Finally, regarding output, we propose to investigate the extent to which the
adoption – and also the implementation (cf. Steunenberg 2019) – is flanked by
pro-active and professionalized communication efforts to claim credit for
responsive policy (cf. Meijers et al. 2019). Which media channels and audi-
ences are addressed? How intense are communication efforts and campaigns?
How is public communication of policy output timed? Which self-legitimation
standards are employed in justifying or preparing a given policy choice? These
questions suggest mapping the supply of public, policy-specific communi-
cation especially through content analysis methods across EU institutions
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and time, revealing how the link between public opinion and policy contents
is constructed (see e.g., De Bruycker 2017). This would provide insights as to
how far EU institutions are willing and able to deal with the challenges of
differentiated politicization and mediatization.
Empirical and systematic research along these lines would allow us to trace
how public opinion ‘enters’ the different organizations involved in EU policy-
making, how it ‘travels’ within these organizations and, finally, how it affects
not only the policies but also the communication that ‘leave’ the organization.
Rather than understanding responsiveness as a repeated one-shot game in
which policy is adapted to a single, consistent public opinion that exists
prior to decision-making, this model describes an adaptive circle in which
governance organizations interact (with relevant parts of) the European citi-
zenry through mediatized discourses (cf. Lee 2014).
One might object that allowing for purely communicative action blurs the
concept of policy responsiveness. Of course, our point is not to suggest that a
high level of procedural responsiveness would compensate for a lacking con-
gruence of citizen preferences and EU policy. Yet, given that public opinion on
the EU is influenced by elite cueing to a significant degree (e.g., Steenbergen
et al. 2007), given that knowledge about the EU varies strongly among Euro-
pean citizens (e.g., Hobolt 2007; Karp et al. 2003), and given that public sal-
ience of issues exceeding the domestic domain is inherently volatile
(Oppermann and Viehrig 2011), we consider this procedural and communica-
tive broadening of research on responsiveness as a much needed asset. In
particular, the approach we sketch here promises to explain the conundrum
that significant portions of the citizenry still hardly perceive EU policy-
making as responsive despite the large congruence between aggregated
opinion polls and aggregated EU policy output that the systemic models
have uncovered.
Notes
1. A notable, yet currently contested exception is the attempt to link the Commis-
sion presidency to the outcome of European elections through the ‘Spitzenkan-
didaten’ process (Hobolt 2014).
2. More generally, it also questions in how far polls initiated by policy-makers
provide unbiased measures of public opinion. Especially the Eurobarometer
polls contracted by the European Commission have recently been rather inter-
preted as strategic tools to influence the public discourse (Haverland et al. 2018;
Höpner and Jurczyk 2015).
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